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Foreword
Migration in the Mediterranean region goes beyond im-
ages of small boats overloaded with refugees trying to 
cross the sea in pursuit of a better life in Europe. These 
images and the associated narratives fail to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the multitude of reasons and 
effects of people moving in the region. The area including 
North Africa, the Levant, Turkey, and the EU has always 
been the site of many of these different movements, and 
since the uprisings of 2011, new dynamics and alarming 
realities have been added to the phenomena. To mention 
a few examples, Libya, which had been the destination 
of labor migration for decades, became a starting point 
for refugees during the war in 2011. Tunisians who had 
migrated to the Gulf States and other countries returned 
when political change was underway in their homeland. 
And in Syria the brutality of the civil war and the dra-
matic deterioration of living standards has forced millions 
of people to flee, either becoming internally displaced or 
seeking refuge in neighboring countries or other coun-
tries in the region, including North African countries. 
Migration flows are complex and varied phenomena. 
People leave their countries of origin for different rea-
sons, either forced by violent conflict or responding to 
political, social, or economic factors, or a combination of 
both. Their movement is not necessarily unidirectional, 
as exemplified by multiple internal displacements, return 
movements, and seasonal migration. In all cases, move-
ments of people alter and influence societies, both in 
sending and receiving countries. For example migrants 
can be powerful political actors transforming their host 
as well as their home countries through active political 
engagement, but they can also shake fragile political 
and social equilibriums and contribute to destabilization 
with a “spillover effect” on neighboring countries. They 
can positively contribute to economies through work and 
remittances, but they can also cause “brain drain” and 
antagonize the local work force. In this context, migrants 
are often confronted with xenophobia and racism and 
serve as scapegoats for all sorts of grievances, which only 
adds to the misery caused by traumatic experiences, ma-
terial hardship, and bureaucratic burdens.
As a consequence, the presence of migrants heavily 
shapes discourses and notions of citizenship, identity, and 
statehood, directly affects social cohesion and stability, 
and hence confronts states and international organiza-
tions with enormous challenges. International organiza-
tions do play a role in providing relief for affected people. 
But in the absence of a binding global regime to govern 
the international movement of people, migrants depend 
primarily on the interests of and cooperation between 
nation states. 
This conference aimed primarily to analyze more 
recent flows of people stemming from, or targeting, coun-
tries in North Africa and to explore their political, social, 
and economic impact on sending and receiving societies. 
It enabled cross-country comparisons and exchange of ex-
periences and brought together academics, practitioners, 
and activists working in the field. It shed light on migra-
tion policies of relevant actors and identified necessary, 
missing measures that place the human rights dimension 
at the center of the debate and the policy-making process. 
Dina Fakoussa
Head of EUMEF
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Summaries of Presentations
This report presents a selection from the total of 26 presen-
tations that were delivered during the conference, includ-
ing partial summary of the subsequent panel discussions.
Intimate Movements:  
Tracing the Effects of Migration in North Africa
Rather than focusing solely on the processes and agents, 
the presentation aimed at questioning and further devel-
oping the very concept of migration. Through multi-year 
anthropological research on the imaginative and tangible 
meaning of migration for the local population in Mo-
rocco’s Tadla region, the speaker highlighted its pervasive-
ness beyond the limited circle of those directly involved in 
the movement of people across borders. A local’s remark 
that “the outside is everywhere here” reflects that migra-
tion has grown into being a fundamental aspect of local 
life in Tadla, “becoming the entity through which kinship 
relations are nurtured, the passing of time is measured, 
and gendered subjectivities emerge and are recognized.” 
The speaker stressed that understandings of life’s build-
ing blocks were affected by migration as it intruded even 
into intimate parts of daily life. Temporality is only one 
dimension of this, as the coming and going of people and 
goods is determined by bureaucratic regimes in Europe, 
and life is, accordingly, at least partially synchronized 
with for example the French calendar of public holidays. 
These findings suggest, amongst others, that migration 
studies should move beyond merely assessing causal rela-
tions of the movements of mobile bodies to considering 
ontologically the concept and imaginaries related to mi-
gration. Such a refocus could render the concept not only 
sharper but also closer to those who are affected by it. 
Participants widely appreciated the shift of focus from 
the dominant socio-economic dimension of migration and 
the emphasis on its impact on biographies. Subsequently, 
this led to a discussion on the gender dimension in the 
case of Tadla and cross-Mediterranean migration more 
generally. In Tadla, young men, and especially those with-
out university education, are almost expected to cross the 
Mediterranean at some point, whereas it is socially far less 
accepted for unmarried women to migrate on their own. 
Therefore, the vast majority of emigrants are young and 
unmarried males. However, both men and women return-
ing with official papers of residence in Europe are seen as 
an “asset” for the local marriage market. There is also a 
whole strand of literature dealing with women who stay 
in their country of origin while their husbands migrate in 
order to work abroad. According to the speaker, on the one 
hand, they do gain a significant level of independence, but 
at the same time the disadvantages which arise by waiting 
for their husbands for years, e.g. postponing having chil-
dren, should not be underestimated. 
Moving People, Moving Conflict:  
How Forced Migration transforms Conflicts
Acknowledging the often-quoted state-centrism of politi-
cal science, especially in comparison to anthropology, 
this presentation offered a critique of migration studies 
and suggested alternative approaches. In the analysis of 
migration studies’ shortcomings, three important dimen-
sions were identified. Firstly, state thinking seems all but 
entrenched in the discipline, with scholars not only focus-
ing on, but also thinking like states. The fact that polities, 
policies, and politics are primarily shaped but also ana-
lyzed with a state-nation-citizen trinity in mind, renders 
refugees an aberration and ultimately “disposable people.” 
Secondly, compartmentalization is reflected in research 
as questionable legal categories are used by scholars. And 
lastly, policy-orientation is crowding out investigations on 
a variety of profound questions. 
By referring to a transnational analysis of Kurdish 
forced migration, the speaker sought to utilize de-
territorialized space as the unit of analysis and treated 
displacement as a means of statecraft. In Turkey, the Kurd-
ish question arose as a consequence of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement which established nation states in the region 
for the first time. What followed was a low-intensity war 
in Eastern Turkey that led to internal displacement within 
the country, but also emigration to Germany, among other 
countries. The Turkish government’s official narrative un-
til 2001 was that 370,000 people were evacuated from the 
region for security reasons. The strategy of displacement, 
however, boomeranged back at the state as the disper-
sion of Kurds created a new space for politics and identity: 
diaspora and transnational activities allowed Kurds to 
create new communities and to utilize new ways of nation-
building and identity-formation, challenging Turkish poli-
tics through international advocacy networks as well as 
gaining a new distinct legal status in host countries. In the 
discussion it was noted how the issue of compartmental-
ization pertained to other cases, such as Syrian refugees 
across the MENA region, where it had profound implica-
tions for their rights in host countries. 
Migration and Mobility in Tunisia:  
Human, Societal, and Political Dimensions
The upheavals in Libya in 2011 led to a sudden wave of 
refugees. Due to the geographical concentration of eco-
nomic activity, and hence population, in the Tripolitania 
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area, Libya’s western neighbor Tunisia received the stun-
ning number of 230,000 refugees, while it was simultane-
ously undergoing political transition. Moreover, not only 
Libyans fled the chaos and fighting in their home state. 
The country has long been a destination for migrants itself. 
The multinational makeup of the Libyan workforce meant 
that persons with more than 120 different nationalities 
escaped across the border to Tunisia.
At the same time, the speaker noted that there was a 
concurrent wave of migration from Tunisia to Europe. The 
major destination was the southern shore of Italy. As a re-
action to the sudden influx of refugees, Italian authorities 
started to grant residence permits that allowed migrants 
to move freely in the Schengen area. This was discussed 
controversially and criticized by most other European 
states. In particular the French government, which tried 
to reduce immigration in its own country, was censorious 
toward this step. Hence, the issue seriously challenged 
Italy’s relationship with France and at least briefly even 
put the entire Schengen regime into question as the two 
countries quarreled about its implementation. Neverthe-
less, Italy recognized the Tunisian authorities’ difficulties 
to control their own coasts during the upheavals and be-
came one of the leading partners in strengthening border 
control in early 2011. 
The European Union reacted to the uprisings, and not 
least to the potential increase in migration, by offering 
negotiations about a mobility partnership and a deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement as part of its privi-
leged partnership with Tunisia. Those instruments were 
not newly designed in order to tackle the altered situa-
tion in the EU’s Southern neighborhood but were rather 
invented already a decade ago, with the aim of deepening 
the EU’s relations with its Southern neighbors. They were 
not only offered to Tunisia, but also to several other Arab 
states. However, while the interim-government in Tunis 
instantly accepted to start negotiations and in March 
2014 eventually signed the proposed mobility partnership, 
Egypt for example refused to take part in talks until the 
day of the conference. In Tunisia, civil society organiza-
tions as well as migration experts have expressed severe 
apprehensions with regard to the agreement, describing 
it as lacking transparency and criticizing the fact that it 
was signed by a transitional government, even though it 
is a long term agreement. It was also denounced on the 
claim that it does not place human rights and refugee 
and asylum seeker rights as a priority. Moreover, it would 
primarily serve the EU’s interests, whereas Tunisia would 
not benefit equally.
The discussion that followed addressed the number, sta-
tus, and perception of Libyan migrants in Tunisia. While 
some media outlets claim that there are over one million 
Libyans residing permanently in Tunisia, the speaker 
called this number exaggerated and estimated that 
300,000 Libyans actually lived in Tunisia, whereas one 
million were perpetually traveling between the two coun-
tries. Those who traveled back and forth were mainly 
doing so for business and accordingly, their relations 
with the Tunisian people were very different from those 
of Libyans who were not involved in commerce but had 
rather fled the country, in most cases because they were 
supporters of the former regime. According to the speaker, 
even though it is very unlikely that they will be able to 
return in the near future, they reject being considered 
refugees. In addition, the Tunisian authorities do not see 
them as such because otherwise Tunisia would, in a single 
blow, become the biggest host to Libyan refugees. This in 
turn would have severe implications for their legal status 
and increase the authorities’ responsibilities.
Being asked about the role of civil society regarding mi-
gration to and from Tunisia, the speaker distinguished be-
tween three types of involvement. Firstly, several Tunisian 
and African NGOs work together on defending the rights 
of sub-Saharan African migrants. He considered those to 
be the most valuable organizations, because even sub-
Saharan African students with a legal status often receive 
ill-treatment in Tunisia and racism is a prevalent problem. 
Secondly, some Tunisian NGOs, like the Tunisian Forum for 
Social and Economic Rights, intervene in cases of accidents 
at sea and defend and support the families of migrants 
who come to harm during their passage. And thirdly, after 
2011 and with the influx of refugees from Libya, several 
associations were founded to assist them and provide im-
mediate support. The work of these organizations was and 
is accompanied by the actions of individuals who primarily 
help the incoming Arab refugees from Libya.
Tunisia’s transformation from being a transit to a host 
country was discussed intensively and there was a consen-
sus that the state as well as society need to acknowledge 
this reality and start shaping the discourse and policies 
accordingly. The usefulness of the term “illegal migrant” 
was also questioned. As human beings cannot be illegal, 
but rather their act of crossing borders,  “irregular migrant” 
was widely preferred and it was noted that it was indeed 
the term used by international organizations such as the 
European Union. One participant noted the biased nature 
of focusing on economic motivations for migration as this 
distorts understanding of the issue: curiosity for what 
is beyond one’s own country’s borders is not limited to 
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 Europeans, but may well motivate many (North) Africans, 
too. At the end, the high political sensitivity and emo-
tionality surrounding migration was manifested in the 
developments that followed the relatively small number 
of Tunisians entering Italy after the uprising and travel-
ling on to France, as this incident alone shook the whole 
Schengen agreement. 
Migrants’ Lives and the Local Population in 
Oujda City, Morocco
Oujda, a provincial capital close to the Algerian border as 
well as the Mediterranean, lies in a strategic location for 
people who try to transit Morocco on their way to Europe. 
Their situation in the city and their interplay with local 
actors lay at the heart of this presentation. 
The speaker pointed out that, in general, the residents 
of Oujda do not distinguish between “ordinary” migrants 
and refugees who had fled from a conflict. Keeping dis-
tance initially, the local population, nevertheless, soon 
acknowledged the humanitarian problems associated with 
migration, and in the past years, there were more signs 
of proximity and social empathy. The media did play an 
important role in that respect as the portrayal of migrants 
has had a decisive impact on their perception. Traditional-
ly associated with crime and other problems, the coverage 
has recently become more balanced. 
The majority of migrants in Oujda are residing in a 
temporary settlement on the grounds of the Law Faculty 
of University Mohamad I, which has subsequently been 
dubbed “The African Union Camp,” due to the make-up 
of nationalities. Under the condition of adherence to basic 
rules, the university offers migrants the possibility to stay 
on its grounds for a fee of 200 Moroccan Dirham, and 
thereby utilizes its legal freedoms under Moroccan leg-
islation. Nigerians, who are not permitted on the faculty 
premises, have carved out an alternative camp in the Sidi 
Maafa woods. 
Representatives of the different migrant groups, mainly 
defined by nationalities, regularly convene in a tent to 
discuss problems and settle disputes. The majority of the 
migrants in Oujda rely on begging as their only source of 
income, while only a small minority runs small-sized busi-
nesses. Some civil society organizations’ efforts to sup-
port them are met with mixed reactions. While material 
support with food, shelter, and basic needs is appreciated, 
attempts to raise awareness about migrants’ rights are 
mostly met with disinterest. 
The discussion first revolved around the legal status 
and the self-organization of migrants in Oujda. The speak-
er’s remarks led to amazement as the participants were 
surprised to hear that the leadership selection among the 
migrants worked by way of a wrestling challenge against 
the current leader. It was similarly peculiar for most at-
tendees that the reason for Nigerians’ ban in the camp was 
that they never lived in the same area as Cameroonians. 
Lastly, there was speculation as to who benefited from the 
entry charge of 200 Dirham, with one participant suggest-
ing that high-ranking staff in the university administra-
tion may take part of this fee. Underlining the freedoms 
enjoyed by institutions of higher education, the Moroccan 
participants described university presidents as “little 
kings” in Morocco. 
One participant elaborated on a comparable case in 
another part of Morocco: the forêt gourougourou. This area 
is also occupied by migrants who have set up what is ef-
fectively their own statelet, including ministers of finance 
and international relations. 
Interpreting Morocco’s Exceptional  
Regularization Program
One of the most significant recent developments regarding 
migration in North Africa was the regularization program 
announced by the king of Morocco in September 2013. In 
the past decade, the discourse in Morocco was one of crim-
inalization and racist practices. According to the speaker, 
the initiative can hence be interpreted as a policy shift, 
which can be explained with national as well as regional 
ambitions and policies.
The presenter explained that a list of criteria defines 
who is eligible for regularization, such as being a UNHCR 
recognized refugee and having a proven residency of at 
least five years. Until today, about 1,000 of the 40,000 
already submitted applications have been accepted. Most 
incoming migrants are from sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, even though the picture has changed over the past 
decades, and Asians, Filipinos, or French irregular work-
ers are now also part of the increasingly mixed migrant 
population. This new reality gradually questioned the pol-
icies of strict border control and anti-immigration policies 
from 2003. In autumn 2005, 1,400 migrants tried to climb 
the border fences and were shot at, eventually leading to a 
diplomatic crisis and bringing even more public attention 
to the issue of migration. An increasing number of stake-
holders pushed for reform and change and challenged the 
established discourse, not least because Moroccan civil 
society has become more vocal. All of this triggered the 
Moroccan state to begin considering the need for policy 
reform. After the Arab uprising the issues of democracy 
and human rights came to the forefront again, signifi-
cantly affecting the discussion on migrants’ rights because 
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they were integrated in the discourse on democratization 
of state policies as such. The constitutional reform of 2011, 
accordingly, enshrined for the first time specific rights for 
refugees and migrants. 
The domestic context alone, however, is insufficient 
to understand and explain the policy change. In the past, 
Morocco’s economic priorities and policies were highly 
linked to the EU’s agenda, but the economic crisis in 
Europe pushed Morocco to rebuild stronger relations with 
African countries. This is exemplified by the Moroccan 
king’s tour through the continent in February 2014, which 
seems to be a step toward reintegrating into the African 
Union, which Morocco had left in 1987. This, of course, is 
not compatible with the denial of sub-Saharan African 
migrants’ rights in Morocco.
At the same time, the policy shift was also a signal 
toward the EU. Morocco promoted itself as a leader for mi-
gration policy making in the Maghreb, thereby playing the 
role of “Europe’s gendarme.” Moreover, the regularization 
program could be used by the Moroccan government dur-
ing the negotiations with the EU about a mobility partner-
ship because it strengthens Morocco’s position, not least 
with regard to the regularization of Moroccans in Europe.
The new policies as well as the reliability of recent 
activities were discussed controversially. One participant 
highlighted that regularization was a time-consuming and 
selective process not all migrants were capable of going 
through. Moreover, it was still unclear if the regulariza-
tion policy would be permanent and if it would be ac-
companied by other legal benefits. Another participant 
argued that the shift occurring in Morocco did not present 
a clear cut picture, because on the one hand, migrant 
rights were being embraced but on the other hand, certain 
sub-Saharan African migrants were still discriminated. 
Hence consensus was that laws and regulations need to 
be complemented with a shift in perceptions and attitudes 
and that this mind set is essential for a successful integra-
tion of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. It was also 
criticized that civil society organizations had not been 
involved in the drafting of the new policies. Besides, the 
Moroccan state authorities are usually very defensive as 
far as human rights are concerned; people who demand 
human rights are regularly treated as spies. 
A Holistic Approach toward Underprivileged 
Host Communities and Obstacles to  
African Refugee Integration in Cairo 
In the past, Egypt was primarily regarded as a transit 
country but, as the speaker argued, it is gradually becom-
ing a host nation for refugees as well. Resettlement is 
diminishing because an increasing number of migrants 
gets rejected on their passage to Europe and, hence, settle 
in Egypt. As there are no refugee-camps in the whole 
country, the majority of them are living in regular resi-
dential neighborhoods together with underprivileged 
Egyptians who struggle with economic hardship them-
selves. Accordingly, refugees often have to fight for their 
space within the informal sector of economy and problems 
with the host communities arise frequently. Therefore, 
greater attention should be paid to the situation of the host 
communities, besides the mainstream research focus on 
analyzing policies and the work of civil society.
Based on interviews with underprivileged Egyptians, 
their local leaders, and activists who work in awareness-
raising projects such as Tawasol, the speaker argued that 
refugees were primarily perceived as guests who were 
expected to follow local social norms but not consid-
ered fellow inhabitants and citizens. This perspective is 
fostered by Egyptian nationalism, which plays an impor-
tant role for the Egyptian identity and the legitimization 
of the current regime. Therefore, the demarcation from 
the “other” is core, so the argument, which has significant 
implications for the situation of refugees: the more similar 
they are the more accepted. The importance of religion 
with regard to the treatment and integration of migrants 
was highlighted as well. It influences attitudes and reac-
tions of Egyptians. One participant shared her experience 
that Sudanese girls who wear the khimar (body cover-
ing) and speak a specific dialect were widely perceived as 
being closer to Egyptians, especially in contrast to black 
Africans. Another example mentioned were Somalian 
refugees who study at Al Azhar. They are usually treated 
with more respect than other refugees from Somalia. And 
in a conservative Muslim neighborhood, a Muslim woman 
would probably be more integrated than a Christian 
woman, while a veiled Muslim woman would more likely 
be considered part of the community than a non-veiled 
Muslim woman.
Nevertheless, tensions, differences, and not least com-
petition in economic terms lead to ill-treatment of refu-
gees. Here again, the degree of “otherness” is decisive, as 
refugees from Syria, for example, experience significantly 
less discrimination. Yet, it is a common sight to see local 
children throwing stones at refugees or to hear Egyptians 
making negative remarks about their skin color. Nonethe-
less, the majority of interviewees refused to accept the 
label racism but rather referred to the “normal fun-loving, 
humorous Egyptian attitude” to explain their behavior. 
Based on the findings, the speaker concluded with three 
recommendations. Firstly, the Egyptian government 
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should revisit its reservations such as banning refugee 
children from public schools. Secondly, the Egyptian 
public should develop a more inclusive attitude and a 
sense of shared responsibilities with regard to the change 
from Egypt being a transit to a host country. Thirdly, civil 
society organizations should do more to take into consid-
eration the desires and needs of the host communities and 
not only focus on the refugees themselves.
In the subsequent discussion, the analysis and espe-
cially the shift of focus toward the host community were 
widely regarded as being extremely valuable. One major 
point of interest was the change from being a transit to 
being a host country. Egyptian participants explained 
that this fact was neglected by the authorities as well as 
the migrants themselves. The Egyptian state denies that 
problems such as racism and ill-treatment even exist and 
does not want to provide services. Therefore, it uses the 
excuse that Egypt is only a transit country and, more-
over, is too occupied with its own problems. On the other 
hand some refugees themselves do not want to be seen 
as permanent inhabitants because they are not willing 
to believe that they might live in Egypt for a long time. 
Rather, they hope to continue their journey to Europe. 
Accordingly, they do not put a lot of effort into becoming 
integrated. 
The Situation of Syrians in Post-Morsi Egypt
As the speaker’s analysis was mainly based on personal 
experiences with the Center for Refugee Solidarity, the 
work of the NGO was introduced. Its main objectives are 
to generate awareness, make the refugee’s voices heard, 
and ensure the implementation of international stan-
dards through advocacy. An important part of this work is 
the documentation of rights abuses, a lack of which was 
noted by the initiators of the project when compared to 
the relatively wide availability of, for example, legal ad-
vice. This task is currently challenged by the authorities’ 
ongoing crackdown on human rights activists.
In Egypt, domestic as well as regional and internation-
al political developments significantly influence the poli-
cies and general attitudes toward refugees. Accordingly, 
observers noted key changes since the uprisings of 2011. 
While the refugee community was initially completely 
neglected due to the political turmoil, two months into 
the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt opened the bor-
ders for Syrian and Palestinian refugees. However, only 
one week after the army had ousted Morsi from office, 
Syrians were required to apply for a visa and go through 
security checks to enter Egypt. This links in with a revival 
of Egyptian nationalism fomented by the army, which 
necessitates the role of “the other,” filled in this case by 
the Muslim Brotherhood. As the authorities suggested an 
association of Syrians and Palestinians with the Brother-
hood in the course of their security crackdown, they not 
only de-nationalized the Brotherhood but also created a 
strong anti-Syrian and anti-Palestinian sentiment. This 
led the Syrian refugees to attempt to be less visible, but 
soon those participating in protests were detained and 
travel restrictions against Syrians in general increased. 
Tensions between the Egyptian society and Syrian 
refugees arose, deepened by the regime’s rhetoric but 
also by measures such as the distribution of 259,000 food 
vouchers to Syrians by the World Food Program, which 
angered many Egyptians who felt entitled to food and 
aid as well. Another example is the relocation of Syrians 
to a new hospital with better facilities by UNHCR, which 
deepened Egyptians’ frustration. While 140,000 Syrian 
migrants are registered under the mandate of UNHCR, 
between 40,000 and 50,000 are not but hope to return 
to Syria as soon as possible. Many migrants choose not 
to register because the issued “yellow card” is not only 
supplemented with a six month residency and regularized 
access to education and health but also with a stamp in 
their passport that limits mobility. 
In the following discussion still the relatively good le-
gal status of Syrians in Egypt was highlighted. For exam-
ple, Syrians not only have the right to work, but also enjoy 
access to the public health system. This status stands 
out in comparison with other refugee groups who do not 
necessarily enjoy such rights. Despite their high number 
(140,000 estimated at the time of writing), the presence of 
Syrian refugees is still not felt too strongly. Given Egypt’s 
large population of over 80 million people, Syrians do not 
constitute a very big group within the country. Finally, it 
was reiterated that the government simply avoids admit-
ting that there are problems such as racism. The media is 
not helping to reconcile the Egyptians with the migrants 
either but on the contrary further fuels the situation. For 
example, they portray Syrians negatively and some TV 
presenters have even threatened them live on air.
Representation of Syrian Refugees in  
Turkish Newspapers before the Municipal  
Elections, 2014
When it comes to the representation of Syrian refugees in 
the Turkish press, the first thing one might notice is that 
estimations about how many Syrians are in the country 
differ significantly. While the Turkish foreign minister 
claimed that in November 2013 there were 200,048, an 
agency of the prime ministry counted over 490,000 in 
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June 2013, and the latest UNHCR data provides estimates 
of more than 640,000. The discrepancies arise mainly 
from different methods of counting. But more important 
than the precise numbers is the public sentiment that 
“Syrians are everywhere” in Turkey.
It was the bombings in the border province Hatay in 
May 2013 that brought the conflict in neighboring Syria 
into public consciousness in Turkey. From its previous 
“zero-problems” policy toward neighboring states, the 
AKP government quickly repositioned itself as an anti-
regime force in support of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Sunni Islamist groups in the region, including those 
fighting against the Assad regime in Syria. This new par-
tisan policy toward the Syrian conflict was also reflected 
in the government’s domestic dealing with refugees as 
well as the coverage of the media. 
Pro-government papers tended to focus their cover-
age on the ordeals suffered by Sunni refugees, and only 
a small minority of publications dedicates any space to 
the fate of, for example, Shia, Alevi, or Kurdish refugees, 
who often face difficulties in gaining access to camps. 
They portray Syrian refugees often as needy, oppressed, 
dangerous, and a drain on domestic resources such as the 
state budget. Beyond the already difficult humanitarian 
situation, such reporting reinforces an “us-versus-them” 
dichotomy in public perception. While the majority of 
outlets convey in their reporting a sentiment that Syrians 
in Turkey should show gratitude for being allowed to stay, 
pro-government publications use this to convey generos-
ity in the government’s policy.
Concerning the impact of political change in Egypt 
on the politics of the wider region, the peculiar develop-
ment of the “Rab’aa sign” in Turkey was reported. This 
symbol – the show of four fingers – first emerged in Egypt 
to express opposition to the removal of then-president 
Mohamed Morsi by the country’s military after protests 
on Cairo’s Rab’aa square had been aggressively dispersed 
by security forces. In Turkey, the sign quickly became 
popular across the political spectrum. It then turned into 
a partisan symbol suggesting support for the AKP govern-
ment and was even used by Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan at a public event. 
The Qaddafi Loyalists “Azlam” in Egypt 
Exchange between Libya and Egypt has a centuries-long 
history, with many intermarriages and economic links be-
tween the countries. In more recent decades, the respec-
tive governments have also frequently tried to capitalize 
politically on the presence of their neighbor’s citizens 
in their country, for example by harboring  political 
 opponents of the regime. 
In addition to humanitarian refugees, the conflict in 
Libya in 2011 also forced supporters of the Qaddafi regime 
to flee the country. Upon the outbreak of fighting, the 
Egyptian authorities initially practiced an open door 
policy toward all Libyan refugees and Egyptians living 
in Libya as well as allowing Libyans access to medical 
services in Egypt. This was later tightened due to security 
concerns and 18–40 year-olds in particular found it harder 
to enter the country legally. More recently, the Libyan au-
thorities granted $40 million to support their diaspora in 
Tunisia and Egypt – a measure that will further improve 
their relatively safe economic situation, which is also 
based on businesses and investments that have their ori-
gin before the Arab uprisings. Conversely, the Egyptian 
authorities have cooperated with the new Libyan govern-
ment in judicial affairs, including the prosecution and 
handing over of high-profile cases of Libyans in Egypt. 
In the subsequent discussion, participants were di-
vided over the question whether the presence of Qaddafi 
supporters in Egypt may bring advantages to the host 
country. A fierce debate erupted when an argument went 
that Egypt should establish good relations with the Azlam, 
as they might return to powerful positions in Libya and 
fill in the political vacuum. Many viewed this as a saluta-
tion of a return of the authoritarian Qaddafi system and 
therefore heavily opposed it.
Return Migration in Morocco:  
Biographies and Motivations
Even though some researchers refuse to talk about the 
issue of return migration because they argue that mobil-
ity is increasing and the phenomenon of return migration 
has not yet stabilized, the speaker argued that it was im-
portant to focus on return migrants’ trajectory and how 
they bear a socio-economic impact on their society upon 
return. Findings were gained by a large-scale research 
project during which 1,500 households in Morocco were 
interviewed and analyzed.
One of the findings was that the rate of return was 
very low among women, with only 2 percent. There were 
several cases of men wishing to return while their wives 
refused the idea to avoid sliding back into traditional 
norms. The rate of male returnees was high only among 
the pioneers and migrants of the first wave of whom 61.3 
percent had no education at all and whose return deci-
sion was mainly linked to retirement. The large number 
of 85 percent of interviewed returnees was aged between 
60 and 68, wishing to spend the rest of their days in their 
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home country. 67 percent stated that they had a long 
migratory experience of over twenty years. Moreover, 
only 2 percent of them were able to speak or write the 
language of their destination country which was also one 
of the main reasons for the wish to return. 97 percent of 
returnees were household heads with wives and children. 
In many cases the children decided to remain abroad 
while the parents returned alone. Strong links between 
the parents and children were, nevertheless, kept in 
almost all cases. Therefore, many interviewees said that 
they “somehow live[ed] between two countries”, which 
might lead to the conclusion that return in those cases is 
never complete.
During the discussion, the speaker explained that 
second and third generation return was still not high 
although the state had offered incentives for people to 
return, such as a website called “finkom?” where migrants 
can get information on job and investment opportunities. 
Stable jobs and marriage to Moroccan spouses are also 
conducive to resettling in Morocco. Little help, however, 
is offered from Moroccan authorities to encourage emi-
grants to invest in their home country, and many of their 
skills remain unexploited upon their return. The newly 
adopted policies and the openness of the government to-
ward return-migrants since 2011, are seen by many with a 
certain amount of suspicion. Critics argued that the state 
is first and foremost interested in access to the money 
they made abroad but does not care about reintegration. 
When returning to Morocco, even if it is only for a short 
period or vacations, migrants have to balance very dif-
ferent, often conflicting expectations toward them. They 
are requested to make their success abroad visible and be 
ostentatious, but at the same time run the risk of bragging 
too much – a balancing act that mostly goes wrong. One 
participant noted that this was very similar in the case 
of Turkish migrants returning from Germany. Of special 
interest for the group were the cases in which women 
decided to remain in the destination country while their 
husbands returned. Under those circumstances, these 
male senior citizens had difficulties to reintegrate and 
often became isolated, especially when their health was 
deteriorating. 
Transnational Links, Return Migration, and 
Entrepreneurship: The Case of Moroccans 
Returning from Italy
Italy is one of the most important destinations for Mo-
roccan migrants. and Moroccans form one of the largest 
migrant communities in Italy. Yet the number of Moroc-
cans who eventually return after having stayed in Italy for 
several years is comparably high. After their homecoming, 
85 percent become entrepreneurs within five years, even 
though most of them were not involved in business before 
leaving Morocco. They are using the skills they acquired 
in Italy and primarily focus on trade, agriculture, and the 
building sector.
Different enabling factors make conditions for entre-
preneurship favorable in Morocco and, thus, foster this 
trend. Firstly, Morocco was not hit particularly hard by 
the financial crisis and the Moroccan market became an 
even more attractive destination for trade and exports. 
Secondly, the Moroccan government’s integration efforts 
for returning emigrants include consortia as well as the 
creation of networks and contacts with Italian entrepre-
neurs, informing them about investment opportunities in 
Morocco. The Italian government is equally active in that 
respect and provides a variety of incentives and oppor-
tunities for Moroccans to return home, not least in order 
to help Italian entrepreneurs to have trusted partners in 
Morocco who can manage their business ventures and 
represent them. Thirdly, there are of course also personal, 
religious, and cultural reasons to return. For example, 
many parents do not want their children to be alienated 
from their culture and, therefore, they invest back home 
in preparation for the eventual return of their children.
Nevertheless, the returning Moroccans and new 
entrepreneurs face obstacles as well, including the lack 
of knowledge of the changed society and economy in Mo-
rocco, insufficient funding, difficulties in getting access to 
entrepreneurship programs, bureaucracy, and taxes on EU 
imported goods and machines with which local workers 
are not familiar. Interestingly, the healthiest enterprises 
among those analyzed were the ones that are not sup-
ported by financial institutions. Accordingly, the speaker 
reasoned that financial institutions seemed to rather play 
a destructive role instead of enabling entrepreneurship. 
The subsequent discussion at first evolved around the 
question how the Italian authorities support the migrants 
in Italy. The speaker explained that there were many 
migrant community services, funded by the municipality 
of Milan for example, which target Moroccans who are 
involved in private businesses. These municipal projects 
also work with Ghanaian communities, taking advantage 
of transnational connections and the possibility to contact 
business partners in the homeland. Nevertheless, he said it 
is important to acknowledge that these projects come from 
municipalities or semi-public organizations but not the 
Italian government as part of a state designed framework. 
At the end it was stressed that the Moroccan govern-
ment is very well aware of the potential of the Moroccan 
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Diaspora. Hence, in the last few years the number of insti-
tutions working on connecting Moroccans living abroad 
with their home country’s economy is increasing. The 
state is trying to make even second generation Moroccans 
interested in their home country by sponsoring trips and 
visits. Yet administratively, the institutions tasked with 
the engagement do not cooperate sufficiently, at times 
competing instead.
Development and Reform of Diaspora  
Strategies in Transitional Tunisia
Focusing on the example of Tunisia, the presentation 
reviewed the altering engagement of states with members 
of their society who reside outside their borders. Ac-
cording to the speaker, three transitions motivated the 
sending states to more actively engage with their dias-
pora communities abroad: increases in the quality and 
quantity of migration flows, a shift toward the neoliberal 
economic paradigm, which created more possibilities 
for global engagement, and a reconsideration of politi-
cal community and citizenship. Tunisia, being initially a 
traditional sending country, became increasingly aware 
of the potential of its emigrants as Tunisia itself began to 
change politically and economically. Tunisian emigrants 
had, in the meantime, improved their skills and were thus 
of high interest for their country. After almost a decade 
of economic restructuring based on neoliberal lines and 
upon Ben Ali gaining political power, the state quickly 
reached out to nationals residing abroad by setting up 
a special office which was only dedicated to dealing 
with the Tunisian Diaspora. It introduced the category 
of “Tunisians residing abroad” (TREs) and granted them 
the right to vote. However, the government’s domestic 
focus on control, direction, and surveillance came at 
the expense of its engagement with the diaspora. It thus 
became little effective and investments and remittances 
continued to flow outside official channels. 
Since the 2011 uprising, positive change has been read 
into the engagement of TREs in the post-revolutionary in-
stitutions. There were personal and institutional changes 
in their dedicated office. Yet TRE activists are still skepti-
cal about how genuine these changes are and complain 
about a lack of inclusiveness and follow-up of civil society 
demands, amongst others. The legacy of authoritarian-
ism is hard to shake off and the discourse around TREs 
has also changed little; they still are mostly seen as “cash 
cows” and skills bearers rather than genuine citizens. 
Regional comparisons took center stage in discussions. 
Comparing the Tunisian case to Egypt, it was pointed out 
how different the Diaspora communities were. Whereas 
the Maghreb sends most migrants to Western Europe, the 
majority of Egyptian migrants work in the Gulf. In any 
case it was stated that for several countries the political 
changes of 2011 led to a wave of enthusiasm among emi-
grants who decided to return to their countries in spite of 
their suspicions. Even though being primarily welcomed, 
some skepticism remains toward the returners. This can 
be illustrated with the debates in Tunisia about the right 
of bi-nationals to run in the presidential elections. It was 
met with large disapproval. Besides, it was pointed out 
that Diaspora strategies could conflict with assimilation 
and integration efforts in the country of destination. Alto-
gether, the role of Diaspora communities was believed to 
be little studied in the democratization literature, which 
often simply assumes that returning migrants bring with 
them the “good habits” of citizenship when in fact there is 
little empirical work to underpin this. 
Prodigal Sons, Partial Fathers: Explaining 
Variation in Egypt’s Treatment of Emigrant 
Populations
The title of the presentation relates to a biblical story 
wherein a father has two sons. One of them lived far from 
home but was the father’s favorite while the other son, 
who stayed closer to his home, did not receive as much 
love and attention. This was used as a metaphor for the 
way the Egyptian state treats its different categories of 
emigrants: those who migrate to the Western states and 
those who leave for other Arab countries. It is often as-
sumed that a state is either developing a strategy to keep 
links to the diaspora or that it is not very much interested 
in maintaining strong bonds in general. This, however, is 
an over-simplification because empirically states differ-
entiate between the multiple diaspora groups and hence, 
develop separate policies. The difference is due to the 
calculations made by the state, which examines the utility 
of the migrant.
This can be exemplified by taking Egypt as a case study, 
which has the largest emigrant population in the MENA 
region and one of the largest in the world, with 10 percent 
of Egyptians being employed outside of Egypt. At the 
same time it has a wide variation of policies toward its 
emigrants. Those who live in Europe, North America, and 
Australia are referred to as “permanent migrants.” The 
state has developed a comprehensive set of policies to stay 
connected with them and offers free trips to Egypt for a 
selected number of migrants as well as publications, con-
ferences, etc. In contrast, Egyptians in the Arab world are 
referred to as “temporary workers.” No elaborate policies 
are targeting those diaspora groups, but the policies are 
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mostly minimal and reactive. The private sector regulates 
this type of migration but not the state. Hence, there is for 
example only very little reaction to human rights viola-
tions in the gulf.
The main difference in the calculation of the Egyp-
tian government is that it would like to bring back the 
migrants from the Western states, whereas the low and 
medium skilled workers generally attracted by the Gulf 
countries are thought to have higher utility when being 
abroad. The Egyptian government considers their migra-
tion as a safety vault against unemployment and over-
population. The migrants in the Western states, on the 
other hand, are perceived as being high-skilled and part 
of the brain-drain problem. They have a negative utility 
when abroad but if they return home could potentially 
have an important role in Egypt’s development. 
Intra-Arab migration was believed to have three advan-
tages for Egypt. Firstly, and historically speaking, it was 
argued that it helped Egypt to maintain its relevance in 
the aftermath of the 1967 war and manpower was used to 
keep linkages with the Arab world. One might even argue 
that it helped Egypt in terms of reconciliation with its 
Arab neighbors after the peace treaty with Israel and the 
ensuing embargo. Secondly, authoritarianism in Arab host 
countries prevented the Egyptian government from being 
criticized by the emigrants because Egyptians in Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar could not be politically active due to 
restrictions. Thirdly, and regarding Egypt’s policies, Egypt 
primarily tried not to antagonize the host states. The ra-
tionale is that if Saudi Arabia for example abuses Egyptian 
workers, Egypt avoids intervening because it wants to 
keep exporting its workers. This is not least because Egyp-
tian workers who emigrate from Egypt to the Gulf bring in 
sum more remittances than those in the West. 
The subsequent discussion started by taking a closer 
look at the usage of “utility” as the core explanatory vari-
able for the state’s position or reaction toward different 
categories of emigrants. The speaker argued that it was 
the most important indicator but that there were also 
other factors. One can only assume that the amount of 
policies indicates whether the state wants those emi-
grants to return or not. The capacity of the state to deal 
with different Diaspora groups or the level of remittances, 
however, can also be an explanation. Moreover, diaspora 
is made up of both critical and loyal groups. One partici-
pant highlighted the example of Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdoğan who encourages loyal Turkish emigrants in 
Germany to acquire Turkish citizenship and be involved 
in Turkish politics from within Germany, while at the 
same time he tries to exclude critical voices. The brain-
drain phenomenon was also discussed controversially. 
The speaker explained that it was a taboo of some sort in 
Egypt. It was for example considered an embarrassment 
that a scientist would rather work abroad than in Egypt. 
Moreover, it was pointed out that the issue had a political 
dimension as well because frequent protests and com-
plaints about the situation in Egypt by these emigrants 
were negatively affecting the government’s image.
Fight or Flight Response? Irregular Secondary 
Migration and the UNHCR’s Role in Northeast 
Africa
While the UNHCR has been present in northeast Africa 
for over half a century, it is recently facing an unprec-
edented situation: the number of people trying to reach 
Europe from and through the region has increased by a 
staggering 120 percent between 2013 and 2014. 
Over time, the organization’s work has changed as it 
moved from short-term solutions to long-term care for 
refugees, taking on a surrogate state role in the process. 
In Egypt, the existing legal framework does not effective-
ly protect refugees, and the situation became even worse 
when the security situation deteriorated in the wake of 
the 2011 revolution. In Sudan, the government insists on a 
policy of encampment, but 80 percent of asylum seekers 
leave the camps. Many of them are later rounded up or 
caught at the Libyan border. Resettlement slots to other 
countries fall well short of necessity.
The massive surge of people in need and their tendency 
to continue their movement beyond their first contact 
with UNHCR has put the organization’s approach into 
question. It currently adopts a state-centrist perspec-
tive, looking at migration as a problem and essentially 
hindering mobility with its interventions. It may be time 
to rethink this approach, so the speaker. Labor mobility 
schemes for refugees in the ECOWAS states are one rel-
evant example for northeast Africa, as is the idea to allow 
for offshore asylum applications to European Union states. 
Meaningful citizenship seems to be an indispensable part 
of a solution. It may be necessary to stop containing and 
start managing the movement of people. 
The scale of the movement of people once again made 
participants wonder whether the suggested policy chang-
es were even close to enough. Would rejected offshore 
asylum applicants not try the illegal crossing to Europe 
anyway? Are the institutional and legal constraints on 
organizations like UNHCR not too strong to change track 
dramatically enough? The speaker stressed the counter-
factual: in the absence of UNHCR, the situation would 
be a humanitarian catastrophe. At the end, states’ lack of 
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interest in and efforts to resolve issues of refugees was 
pointed out as the major obstacle to constructively tackle 
the issue. One participant put forward the comparison of 
the $1.7 trillion of annual world military spending to the 
UNHCR’s budget of just over $5 billion.
Taking the Soft Law Route: The European 
Commission’s Rule-Making to End Limbo  
Situations Resulting from Non-Removability
It is arguably important to study the consequences of 
policies but, according to the speaker, it is equally vital 
to gain an understanding of how the policies are crafted. 
This is exemplified by the case of migrants with “limbo 
status” in Europe. Normally, when an individual asks 
for asylum in the EU, he or she can either be offered the 
status of a (temporary) refugee or that status can be 
refused, which means that the unsuccessful applicant has 
to return to his or her country of origin. There are cases, 
however, in which migrants whose applications have 
been rejected cannot return, not for objective reasons 
such as health problems or an ongoing war but because 
their embassies refuse to hand out the necessary docu-
ments. These therefore end up in an uncertain limbo 
situation.
In Europe, no unified legislative framework on the EU 
level exists. Instead there is a jigsaw of national frame-
works, with different categories of rights offered by each. 
A common framework is crucial to effectively deal with 
the problem outlined above. The speaker argued that the 
issue should be dealt with at the level of the European 
Commission, whereby a variety of challenges have to be 
overcome during the drafting process. The Commission 
has to take into consideration the positions of the Euro-
pean Council and the European Parliament, as both have 
to approve its suggestions. This has in other cases been 
very difficult in the past. Moreover, there is the risk of 
launching anew the debate over the “return directive” of 
2007, putting into question issues that have already been 
settled. This is dangerous, as it might mean fewer rights 
for some. Member states are generally reluctant to speak 
of migration regularization, for this is often interpreted 
by the public as a factor that attracts further migrants 
(“pull factor”). 
The Commission’s efforts are frequently criticized for 
being soft-law mechanisms that do not provide practical 
solutions. So far, the initiatives include the founding of 
working groups, an EU-return handbook for practitio-
ners, and an outline of evaluation mechanisms. However, 
in terms of the final decisions, national courts play the 
most important role and they differ in their verdicts. For 
example, courts in the Netherlands ruled that those who 
cannot be returned must not be punished, while Belgium 
decided to offer social support to limbo-status migrants. 
This suggests that the Commission’s soft-law approach 
may become effective. When a case is referred to court, 
decisions will be made after consulting references such as 
the handbook, previous studies, and discussions between 
member states. Hence, the soft law as such becomes a 
hard law via the judgment of the European courts.
In the subsequent discussion, the situation of the 
migrants in such limbo situations raised further interest. 
The speaker explained that they almost lived in invisibil-
ity, as they had almost no rights and could neither register 
nor go to city councils. Moreover, she added that it took 
very long to clarify their status, as the involvement of na-
tional courts makes the whole procedure very bureaucrat-
ic and lengthy. Their situation differs markedly from the 
situation of migrants who go through the regular reset-
tling process, are conventionally granted refugee status 
before they arrive to the country of destination, and are 
given accommodation as part of their package. Limbo 
migrants, in contrast, arrive at the country of destination 
first, and then apply for refugee status. 
 
 The conference was held under the Chatham House Rule.
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